Teqnion: The Swedish Dream That Might Not Deliver 🇸🇪
Sweden is home to some of the most sophisticated serial acquirers on the planet. The playbook is clear: buy niche, cash-generative businesses with stable customer bases and high returns on capital, and hold them forever. No flipping, no arbitrage games, no exit IRRs. Just patient compounding. This model, pioneered by Swedish industrialists and perfected by companies like Lifco, Addtech, and Lagercrantz, has turned otherwise boring industrial groups into stock market champions. Enter Teqnion.
Founded by ultramarathon runner Johan Steen, Teqnion was born out of this very tradition. Steen, who once ran for over 24 hours straight through rough mountain terrain, brings the same relentless, high-stamina mentality to capital allocation. His vision for Teqnion was straightforward: to build a long-duration compounder through permanent ownership of small, overlooked industrial businesses.
In theory, it’s a brilliant business model. A small-cap flywheel. You take the free cash flow of the businesses you already own, reallocate it into new acquisitions, and reinvest internally for organic growth. If executed well, this structure becomes an unstoppable engine of compounding. And Teqnion seemed to have all the right early ingredients: skin in the game, disciplined capital allocation, aligned incentives, and a public-market structure with patient, like-minded shareholders.
But theory doesn’t always meet reality.
The Dream Team: Johan Steen and Daniel Zhang
Johan Steen is one of the most respected young capital allocators in Sweden. His obsession with long-term thinking is reflected in his hobbies: ultramarathon racing, extreme endurance events, and a minimalist lifestyle that leaves no room for shortcuts. Steen treats capital the same way he treats distance—don’t burn too early, don’t overreact, don’t stop moving.
In 2023, Steen brought in Daniel Zhang as co-CEO and head of M&A. Zhang is a former management consultant with a sharp analytical mind and a rare ability to combine operational discipline with long-term vision. His appointment was initially met with enthusiasm from long-term shareholders, who saw in Zhang a potential ballast to Steen’s endurance-style leadership. Zhang is pragmatic, decisive, and data-driven. Together, the two seemed like a winning duo.
The board structure also inspired confidence. Insider ownership was high. Founders owned significant stakes. The investor base included Woodlock House Family Capital, run by Chris Mayer, the author of 100 Baggers and one of the most respected voices in long-term investing. Teqnion’s investor letters became a must-read for niche European investors hungry for the next Berkshire.
So what happened?
Cracks Beneath the Surface
Despite the strong leadership and ownership structure, Teqnion started to show signs of strain. The most obvious signal was the revolving door of CFOs. In the span of just a few years, the company saw multiple CFOs come and go, each exit explained with vague language: personal reasons, different career paths, culture fit. It’s hard to build a high-trust, high-performance culture when the person in charge of financial stewardship keeps changing.
More importantly, the acquisitions started to lose their sparkle.
Initially, Teqnion stuck to the Swedish playbook, small, niche businesses in B2B industries, ideally with repeat customers and strong local positions. But recent deals began drifting away from this formula. The UK became a new hunting ground. Expansion abroad is not necessarily a problem, in fact, it’s often a necessity for micro-caps seeking to scale but the quality of the targets raised questions.
Were these really great businesses? Could they stand the test of time? Did they have moats?
The short answer: unclear.
Many of the acquired companies seemed highly cyclical, asset-intensive, or operating in brutally competitive markets. There was little evidence of pricing power, customer lock-in, or durable competitive advantages. Worse, some of the deals looked expensive relative to their quality. Overpaying for undifferentiated businesses is the cardinal sin of capital allocation. And Teqnion seemed dangerously close to crossing that line.
Why the Model Works in Theory
It’s important to understand what makes the serial acquirer model so powerful in the first place.
Unlike traditional private equity, which buys, optimizes, and flips companies within 5–8 years, serial acquirers like Teqnion aim for permanent ownership. This means no exit pressure, no artificial IRR targets, and no incentive to over-financialize the business. It also allows for long-term planning, slow operational improvements, and deep cultural alignment with acquired teams.
The best serial acquirers, think Constellation Software, Lifco, Addtech, build decentralized organizations. HQ allocates capital, sets cultural norms, and provides light-touch guidance. But local management stays in charge. Incentives are aligned at every level. And over time, the group becomes greater than the sum of its parts.
In this model, two growth engines work in tandem:
1. Organic Growth: Each business reinvests internally, upgrades its offering, and slowly increases margins, revenue, and returns on capital.
2. Acquisitive Growth: Free cash flow from the group is reinvested into new acquisitions—ideally at low multiples and in high-quality niches.
If both engines work, you get a compounding machine.
On paper, this should be a compounding machine. But here’s where the story begins to crack and why I no longer believe Teqnion will deliver the returns many investors are hoping for…